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Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the
Public Interest
Ross E. Cheit*
The spirit of the Genuine Tort Reform Conference that
spawned this collection of articles was to provide one good idea for
improving the tort system. The term "tort reform" is generally
employed by those seeking to limit the tort system. Genuine tort
reform, then, seeks to make the tort system better at
accomplishing its existing goals, particularly deterrence and
compensation. The single idea advanced in this article for
improving the tort system is greater transparency.
The need for greater transparency presents itself regularly to
readers of the Trial Digest page of the California Bar Journal. 1
The Trial Digest page contains summaries of recent verdicts and
settlements in notable civil cases across the state. The summaries
often conceal the actual identity of the parties, even when that
information would seem to have possible benefit to the public. For
example:
* In March 2006, under the heading of "Sexual abuse," a
$1,860,000 settlement was described as follows: "Two
minor girls were sexually abused by their school
volleyball coach. (Confidential v. Confidential, Los
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Brown University.
I wish to thank Kristina Kelleher for research assistance and the
Undergraduate Teaching and Research Assistance program at Brown
University for financial support. I am also grateful to Carl Bogus for his
collegiality and support.
1. I receive the Bar Journal as an inactive member of the California bar.
This article will otherwise emphasize examples from Rhode Island because
that is where the Genuine Tort Reform conference was held and it is where I
have lived since 1986 and done occasional trial court research.
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Angeles County Superior Court.)."2 It is understandable
why the minors are confidential; but, why is the
defendant's name confidential? Shouldn't the public
know the identity of the volleyball coach? And the school
district?
* In January 2007, under the heading "Infant brain
damage," a $40,446,660 verdict was described as follows:
"A 5-month-old infant was prematurely brain damaged
after medical personnel failed to timely diagnose Herpes
Encephalitis (Hassanzai v. Confidential, Los Angeles
County Superior Court). 3 While one might think that
plaintiffs name in this case would be a pseudonym, the
real mystery is why the defendant's name is confidential.
The acceptance of this kind of confidentiality in the Bar
Journal suggests that the norms that promote confidentiality are
widely accepted in the profession, and that the benefits of
transparency are underappreciated.
The basic reform idea-greater transparency-is simple.
What it means in practice, however, is complicated. The
discussion of openness in the civil justice system often begins and
ends with the issue of "secret settlements." The public policy
choice is framed in terms of whether or not to prohibit such
settlements. But what that actually means is not obvious. The
narrowest view of such a ban would cover only settlements filed
with the court and sealed by the court. A local rule in the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina has a similarly
narrow view, yet this rule is often described in much broader
terms.4 As any student of the civil justice system knows, very few
cases result in settlement agreements filed with the court. But
almost all cases settle one way or another. The broadest view of a
ban on "secret settlements" includes some kind of reporting
requirement. Florida now requires such reporting in all medical
malpractice cases.5
2. Sexual Abuse, CAL. B.J., Mar. 2006, at 4.
3. Infant Brain Damage, CAL. B.J., Jan. 2007, at 4.
4. U.S. DIST. CT. D.S.C. Loc. Civ. R. 5.03(E) reads: "No settlement
agreement filed with the court shall be sealed pursuant to the terms of this
rule."
5. The Florida Insurance Code mandates reporting by insurance
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Beyond the issue of sealing settlements, many other court
practices implicate the concept of greater transparency.
Protective orders and sealing practices often keep information,
particularly materials obtained through discovery, confidential.
The accountability of defendants and the accountability of the
court system at large are both implicated when an entire case is
sealed, and maybe even when portions of the case are sealed. The
use of pseudonyms for party names is another area in need of
reforms that promotes transparency. In the case of defendants,
this practice raises profound questions about the viability of
accountability mechanisms in the tort system. One might ask if it
really makes a difference whether or not a settlement agreement
is public if the name of the defendant remains confidential. A
combination of these practices produces the kind of case that can
launch a conspiracy theory: where the names of the parties are
pseudonyms and the entire case file is sealed.
The call for greater transparency in the civil justice system is
hardly a novel idea. The first "Sunshine in Litigation Act" was
enacted in Florida in 1990.6 In Rhode Island, Rep. Fausto
Anguilla (D-Bristol) introduced "The Rhode Island Limits to
Secrecy Orders and Agreements Act of 2003."7  This article
engages the rationale for such policies and argues for several bold
reforms in the name of a simple idea: greater transparency.
A. THREE RATIONALES FOR TRANSPARENCY
There are at least three rationales for increasing
transparency in the tort system. The first involves information
and deterrent effects. The second involves the corrosive effects of
secrecy. Finally, there are public integrity arguments for
transparency that extend far beyond tort cases. The first
argument is the most prevalent; the second has not previously
been part of the public debate on this topic; and the third has
gotten short shrift. The odd result is the justifications for the
companies (including those self-insured) to the Department of Health if a
"claim resulted in: (1) [a] final judgment in any amount; (2) [a] settlement in
any amount; [or] (3) [a] final disposition . . . resulting in no indemnity
payment on behalf of the insured." FLA. STAT. § 627.912(1)(a) (2007).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2007).
7. H.R. 5292, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2003), available at
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText03/H5292.pdf.
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initial Government in Sunshine Acts seem almost lost in a debate
about proposals that invoke the namesake (Sunshine in
Litigation) without the underlying rationale for the right to know.
1. Deterrent effects: information as a public good
The most widely-cited rationale for greater transparency is
economic. Under the standard economic view, "secret settlements"
are efficient to the parties, but they impose negative externalities
on the public. Confidentiality can inhibit the process by which the
tort law is supposed to internalize the costs of the defendant's
externalities. The issue can also be seen as an information
problem. Information about settlements is a kind of public good.
If potential plaintiffs are unaware of previous settlements, they
are less likely to bring their own claims. Similarly, consumers
without access to claims information will not be able to express
their true preferences. In short, under the economic view,
deterrent effects are related to the amount of transparency in the
civil justice system. The less transparency there is, the less likely
that those deterrents will have their intended effect.
Consider the effects in the medical malpractice context. If
medical malpractice cases are settled confidentially, or if verdicts
or settlements are announced without identifying the doctor, then
consumers have no way to utilize this information in selecting a
doctor. In Rhode Island, the Board of Medical Licensure and
Discipline, a division of the Rhode Island Department of Health, is
charged with overseeing the collection of data and dissemination
of physician profiles. According to their web site, the Board must
provide a description of "all the medical malpractice judgments,
arbitration awards and settlements." But for reasons apparently
related to budget limitations and political disagreements the
website does not contain medical malpractice settlements. 9
8. Robert S. Crausman, About the Board, R.I. DEP'T. OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.ri.gov/hsr/bmld/.
9. In responding to an inquiry about this matter, the Chief
Administrative Officer of the Rhode Island Board of Licensure and Discipline
stated that the physician profile law was an "unfunded mandate" that has
"consequently only been incompletely implemented." He also mentioned that
"agreement could not be reached" about how to report information about
medical malpractice suits. Interview with Robert Crausman, Chief
Administrative Officer, Rhode Island Board of Licensure and Discipline (June
4, 2007).
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Moreover, contrary to the stated public policy of making such
information available, there are medical malpractice cases in
Rhode Island Superior Court where the settlement is sealed.10
2. Secrecy and denial: restorative justice requires openness
A second rationale for transparency in the tort system
involves the psychological effects of secrecy. This problem became
readily apparent when the cover-up of sexual abuse in the
Catholic Church was revealed-first through litigation and then
through newspaper reporting. The cover-up was enabled by
confidential settlements. Lawsuits in the 1980s and 1990s often
ended in confidential settlements that included assurances to
plaintiffs that appropriate protective actions would be taken.1
Instead, the offending priests were shuffled around and hidden by
a cloak of confidentiality. In 2002, grand juries in Westchester
and Suffolk County, New York issued reports about clergy abuse.
Both reports recommended a prohibition on confidential
settlement agreements in civil cases.1 2
A different and less familiar claim is that secrecy itself is
corrosive in these contexts. Indeed, overcoming secrecy is literally
the first step to obtaining any kind of remedy for sexual abuse
because sexual abuse thrives on secrecy.' 3 It stands to reason,
then, that secret settlements or sealed case files are objectionable
partly for their effects on the plaintiff. Stated in its strongest
form, this position argues that secret settlements are a kind of
repetition of the underlying offense. As such, they are morally
10. See, e.g., White v. Puerini, No. PC 93-1281, 1996 WL 936967 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1996).
11. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Papers in Pedophile Case Show Church Effort
To Avert Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A12; Daniel J. Wakin, Secrecy
over Abusive Priests Comes Back To Haunt Church, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2002, at Al; see generally Timothy D. Lytton, Clergy Sexual Abuse Litigation:
The Policymaking Role of Tort Law, 39 CONN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
12. Report of the April 'E' 2002 Westchester County Grand Jury
Concerning Complaints of Sexual Abuse and Misconduct Against Minors by
Members of the Clergy, www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resource-
files/reports/WestchesterGrandJuryReport.pdf; Suffolk County Supreme
Court Special Grand Jury, Grand Jury Report CPL §190.85(1)(C),
www.bishopaccountability.org/reports/2003_02_10_SuffolkGrandJury/Suffolk
_FullReport.pdf.
13. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF
VIOLENCE-FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 98 (1992).
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objectionable. Secrecy plays into the dynamics that make the
offense possible in the first place. As Lynne Henderson has aptly
pointed out, we "need to worry about efforts to suppress telling."
14
The desire for a public accounting is what brings many
victims to court in these cases. Bruce Feldthusen found that in
Canada half of the civil complainants for damages due to child
sexual abuse had no expectation of receiving money; plaintiffs
knew that the perpetrator was probably judgment-proof. 15 But
they filed claims to make a point, to establish a public truth. Part
of recovery from trauma is some kind of bearing witness.
16
Raising awareness could help reduce future harm, but bearing
witness is not intentionally instrumental in that way. It is
therapeutic. A system that allows defendants to buy their silence
is a system that allows victims to be used twice. Public
institutions should not tolerate any process whereby defendants
purchase the silence of victims.
The strength of the victim's desire to set the record straight is
illustrated through the many prominent cases where victims have
foregone significant financial offers for refusing to agree to a
confidential settlement. There was a case like this in Rhode
Island involving Mary Ryan, an adult who was raped by Father
Louis Dunn when she was a teenager. Dunn was eventually
convicted of rape on Ryan's complaint brought as an adult.
17
Ryan was also one of thirty-eight people who sued the church.
18
Superior Court Judge Krause later described these cases as "one
of the most protracted litigations of its kind in the country."19 The
defendants advanced every possible argument to inhibit discovery.
When those arguments were lost, the church offered a $14.5
million settlement. 20 Ryan was the only one of the thirty-eight
14. Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 479, 541 (1997).
15. Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 25 OrrAwA L. REV. 203 (1993).
16. HERMAN, supra note 13, ch. 9 (Remembrance and Mourning).
17. State v. Dunn, 726 A.2d 1142, 1146 (1999).
18. Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, No. PC 95-6524, 2003
WL 22048785, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2003).
19. Id. at *2. The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently dismissed
Ryan's appeal. Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174
(R.I. 2008).
20. Michael Mello, Crisis in the Church-Woman Threatens To Open
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who declined to join the settlement. 21 She wanted the litigation to
advance to discovery in the hopes of finding out which church
officials knew about Father Dunn's sexual misconduct and when
they first learned of it. 2 2 Ryan ultimately lost her legal quest on
statute of limitations grounds, 23  so she never received
compensation or a full accounting. The Superior Court decision
dismissing her claim suggests that Ryan's quest for more records
was akin to a wild goose chase. In October 2007, a revelation
during discovery in a different civil suit against the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Providence made headlines and raised new
suspicions that evidence about various priests has been covered
up.2
4
A similar result occurred in the Brisbane (Australia)
Grammar School case where "several former students refused to
accept the payouts, offered on the basis that they signed
confidentiality agreements. '' 25 Plaintiffs should not have to choose
between receiving compensation and being able to speak the truth
about the matter. The Seattle Times described a woman who was
"haunted by anger and guilt" over her confidential settlement with
two medical laboratories that had misdiagnosed Pap smear test
results.26
3. Integrity effects: transparency and good government
A third rationale for greater transparency in the civil justice
system is institutional. Under the institutional view,
Records, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 14, 2002, at A7.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Lawsuit Claims Judge Pushed for Settlement, PROVIDENCE J.,
May 17, 2003, at A4.
23. Ryan, 2003 WL 2204875, at *3.
24. In resisting a discovery request as unduly burdensome, the diocese
argued that there had been allegations "in one way or another" against about
125 priests since 1971. Tom Mooney, In Filing, Diocese Says 125 Priests
Have Been Accused, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 20, 2007, at A2. This number is
twice as high as the previous numbers provided by the diocese, which
reported in a national survey in 2004 that fifty-six priests had been accused
of sexual abuse between 1950 and 2002. Id.
25. Michael McKenna, G-G Scandal Returns to Court, NEWS.coM.Au,
Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.news.com.zu/story/0,10117,16644857-2,00.html?
from=rss.
26. Mark Matassa, Settled in Silence: Bill Proposed To Ban Sealed
Agreements, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at B1.
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transparency promotes good government. It inhibits corruption,
encourages accountability, and instills public confidence. While
this view and the related Freedom of Information movement have
focused largely on the executive branch, the arguments have
similar force with the judiciary. They also have special
application to the civil justice system. There are integrity effects
related to the amount of transparency in the civil justice system.
Those effects were readily apparent in the wake of newspaper
reporting in Connecticut on "super-sealed" cases.
27
The integrity of the tort system itself is also affected by its
level of transparency. Given the political polarization around tort
issues, it is not uncommon for judges to be characterized by critics
as pro-victim or pro-defendant. "Sunshine" may well be "the best
disinfectant" for this problem. 28 Transparency is the only way
that citizens can make judgments about such claims. The
information implicated by these arguments extends beyond
individual cases to the judicial databases of tort cases in general.
"Horror stories" about the tort system could be challenged by
representative data if such data were readily available for
citizens, advocates, and scholars.
The government accountability argument has special force
with one subset of tort cases: where the defendant is a public
entity. In tort cases, where the government is often a defendant,
litigation can raise important questions about government
operations. The meaning of "excessive force" in policing or by
guards in a prison might be at issue in such litigation. Peter
Schuck's book entitled Suing Government provides an excellent
analysis of the effects and unintended consequences of such
litigation.29 Schuck captures the importance of fostering "vigorous
decision-making" by street-level bureaucrats such as police. But
imagine if such suits were all settled confidentially? That might
inhibit internal accountability mechanisms in organizations such
as the police. It would also prevent the larger kind of
27. See infra Part B.3.a.
28. The phrase is from Justice Brandeis. It appears in many forms, all
slightly different and almost never with the second part of the sentence.
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND HOW
THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
29. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983).
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accountability: by citizens and lawmakers.
When the state is a defendant, public monies are at stake,
even though actual payments are often mediated through private
insurance arrangements. Curiously, private actors can become
public in nature through public insurance arrangements. In 2004,
a Pennsylvania judge denied a doctor's request to deal the terms
of a settlement agreement in a medical malpractice case where the
state-funded insurance fund paid seventy percent of the
settlement amount. 30 The judge reasoned that publicly-funded
settlements were clearly covered by the state's Right to Know
Act. 31 The same reasoning resulted in the revocation of a sealed
settlement in a civil rights case filed by a man who sustained a
broken neck while in custody of the Central Falls, Rhode Island
Police Department. 32 U.S. District Court Judge Francis Boyle
sealed the terms of settlement "at the request of lawyers from
both sides."33 The Mayor of Central Falls took issue with that
position and the information was eventually made public. 34 Such
cases implicate not only the public purse, but the oversight of
important agencies such as the police.
B. THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A conference devoted to "genuine tort reform" is undoubtedly
interested in genuine problems, not theoretical ones. It is
appropriate to ask, then, how often is tort litigation shrouded in
secrecy? Is information that would help promote the public good
frequently being suppressed through confidentiality agreements
and other litigation tactics? How often are settlement agreements
sealed?
The issue of secrecy in litigation has attracted what Professor
30. Korczakowski v. Hwan, No. 01-CV-934, 2004 WL 2980666 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Sept. 23, 2004).
31. Id.
32. Court Won't Release Details of Settlement in Injury Case, PROVIDENCE
J., June 2, 1987, at A10.
33. Id.
34. The general amount had already been announced by city officials; the
details of the settlement agreement were only released, however, after a legal
challenge by the Providence Journal. Mark Sennott, Supreme Court Justice
Rules Injury Settlement Must Be Made Public, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 31, 1987,
at A5.
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Laurie Dor6 described as "a literal mountain of commentary."
35
However, few empirical studies have been conducted concerning
the prevalence of secret settlements and other practices. There
has been one significant empirical study at the federal level and
one somewhat similar study at the state level. These studies both
conclude that the practices that have generated so much
commentary about secrecy are quite rare in frequency. While both
studies likely understate the actual frequency of such practices,
these studies nevertheless support the conclusion that these
practices are not common.
The relative infrequency of these practices does not mean that
they are insignificant. Infrequent events can have major
implications. Recent media reporting on court secrecy has most
prominently highlighted the rare but worrisome practice of sealing
an entire case. There have been several systematic studies by
newspapers of court secrecy at the county level. While this
reporting also bears out the infrequency of these practices in
general, it has also provided sufficient details about specific cases
to demonstrate that even infrequent secrecy is quite worrisome.
1. Federal civil cases (2001-2002)
The most comprehensive effort to study sealed settlement
agreements in federal district court is reflected in the Federal
Judicial Center's (FJC) 2004 report, described in Robert Regan's
The Hunt for Secret Settlements.36 The FJC study was spurred by
an inquiry from U.S. Senator Herbert Kohl (D-Wisc.), sponsor of
the Sunshine in Litigation Act. 37  The FJC study surveyed
existing rules and practices and, through extensive original
research, sought to determine how often sealed settlement
agreements were filed in federal district court. The study focused
on civil cases terminated in 2001 and 2002 from a sample of 52
35. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 463, 463 (2006). Dor6 cites thirty-nine law review articles to
support the proposition that "the issue of secrecy in litigation has attracted
nationwide attention and has generated a literal mountain of commentary."
Id.
36. Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Secret Settlement Agreements,
81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 439 (2006).
37. Id. at 441-43.
242 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:232
(out of 94) federal districts. 38  Using electronic records, the
authors searched the docket of 288,846 cases. 39 The authors
concluded that 1,270 cases had sealed settlement agreements. 40
That included 138 cases in which the entire case, including the
docket sheet, was sealed. 41  The total number of sealed
settlements constituted less than one-half of one percent of all
cases.
The report found significant differences in the rate of sealed
settlements across districts. There were three districts that had
no sealed settlements in the two year period: Northern Indiana,
Southern Iowa, and South Dakota. 42 There were also a few
districts, such as Eastern Pennsylvania, which had sealing rates
over twice the national average. 43 Even allowing for significant
undercounting, the incidence rate across districts is still likely to
be well under one percent. 44 The report emphasized that in "97%
of these cases, the complaint is not sealed, so the public has access
to information about the alleged wrongdoers and wrongdoings." 45
The lead researcher, writing separately about the topic, added a
criticism that was not contained in the final report: "although the
sealing of settlement agreements in federal courts is considerably
less frequent than many people fear, there often is an insufficient
public record of what is sealed and why. '4 6
Some of the results reported in the FJC report raise more
reason for concern than is expressed in the official conclusions.
The report downplays the idea that sealed settlements are
problematic entirely on the basis that they are infrequent but
without sufficient regard for the effects of specific cases. The
significant damage done by Catholic priests who sexually abused
38. Id. at 448.
39. Id. at 449.
40. Id. at 452.
41. Id. at 451.
42. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 3 (2004),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdf/$file/sealset3.pdf.
43. Id.
44. The study likely undercounts because it excludes secrecy agreements
in cases simply designated on the docket as dismissed. The study also
overcounts to the extent that some sealed agreements might nevertheless be
subject to Freedom of Information requests.
45. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 8.
46. Reagan, supra note 36, at 461.
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children in Boston was covered up by a relatively small number of
sealed settlement agreements. 47  In fact, the Boston Globe
coverage demonstrates how even a few secret settlements can
account for widespread sexual abuse. 48 The FJC study found that
thirty-one cases in their two-year sample involved sexual abuse. 49
The FJC researchers were not insensitive to these concerns.
Rather, they reported disagreement about what factors might
distinguish a case as having "special public interest"
considerations. 50 They identified six possible factors, without
taking a more specific position on the significance of each:
environmental cases, products liability, professional malpractice,
public party defendant, very serious injury, and sexual abuse.
The fact that five of these six categories are torts explains why
discussions of secrecy in civil cases so often revolve around torts
rather than, say, contracts or injunctions. The final category-
public party defendant-is often a tort case and it is always of
public interest. Cases where financial settlements are paid
implicate public spending, whether by direct payment or through
insurance rates and deductibles. Moreover these causes of action
implicate the operation of government.
Notably, the FJC study found that forty percent of the cases
(n=503) with sealed settlement agreements involved at least one
of the "special public interest" factors. 51 That fact suggests that
frequency alone does not capture the policy significance of these
cases. There were also a sizable number of product liability cases
(n=258).52 While some of the researchers considered all product
liability cases to implicate the public good, others would only
consider certain products and hazards to merit that claim. 5
3
Professional malpractice cases, including medical malpractice,
47. The Geoghan case alone was responsible for "over 50" claims in the
1990s and a settlement over $10 million in 2002 "with an additional eighty-
six victims." Lytton, supra note 11, at 816-17.
48. Carl M. Cannon, The Priest Scandal, AM. JOuRNALIsM REV., May
2002, http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=2516 ("[tihe Globe struck gold when it
fought successfully for access to the previously sealed court records in the
civil suits against [Father John J.] Geoghan.").
49. Reagan, supra note 36, at 457.
50. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Reagan, supra note 36, at 454.
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constituted three percent of the sealed settlements (n=40).54 At
first glance, this is a surprisingly low number of cases, especially
for a category that includes medical, legal, and other kinds of
professional malpractice. But the bulk of those cases are filed in
state court. The remaining notable category of sealed settlements
in the FJC study involved public party defendants. There were
152 of those cases in the two-year sample. 55 Given the strong
presumption that those defendants are subject to their own legal
requirements for transparency, it is remarkable that so many
public entities entered into secret agreements.
Finally, the FJC study contains the first empirical effort to
test the significance of rules that require "good cause" for sealing
settlement agreements. The study was designed specifically to
allow for meaningful comparisons between jurisdictions with
"good cause" requirements and those without them. While there
was a slightly higher rate of sealed settlement agreements in the
jurisdictions without a "good cause" requirement, there was no
statistical difference between the two. 56 In other words, the "good
cause" requirement does not appear to have much actual effect.
That finding is critically important when thinking about solutions
that might result in meaningful change in court openness that is
sustained over time.
2. Rhode Island civil cases (1993-1999)
There has been one systematic state-level study of sealing
practices in civil court. The study focused on superior court cases
over seven years in Rhode Island.57 Conducted through the
Taubman Center at Brown University, the study identified sealing
practices that were reflected in electronic docket sheets of civil
cases.58 Records from over 31,000 cases were examined. 59 Only
54. REAGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 8.
55. Id.
56. Reagan, supra note 36, at 448 n.56.
57. See Ross E. CHEIT ET AL., PUBLIC COURTS, PRIVATE RECORDS:
ACCESSIBILITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE RHODE ISLAND COURT SYSTEM
(2000), available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/TaubmanCenter/
FOI/htmllindex.html. This study was conducted by students at the Taubman
Center for Public Policy and American Institutions under the director of the
author of this article.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 23.
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eighty-seven cases were identified through the electronic docket as
having sealed documents. 60 While those were the focus of the
study, the researchers eventually learned that the court clerk had
a file card system that identified approximately five hundred
items, including entire cases, sealed between 1993 and 1999.61
The clerk agreed to produce a list of the docket numbers of those
cases, but never actually did so. 62
Why did so few cases involving sealed dockets appear that
way in the electronic record? Inconsistent and minimal use of the
codes for specific motions was major reasons. For example, the
codes MSR (Motion to Seal Record) and OSR (Order to Seal
Record) were used in only two of the seventy-four docket sheets
located for cases with sealed documents. 63 The seventy-four cases
were identified through other words that appeared in the docket;64
but the study demonstrates how court clerks, who do not really
distinguish motions by their content, use a few generic codes when
far more specific ones exist. "In the majority of cases sealing was
coded [in the electronic docket] as 'Order to Enter' or simply
'Other."' 65 This should not be surprising, but it should give pause
to the exuberance with which some researchers have greeted
electronic records. 66
Following the federal rule on protective orders, judges in
Rhode Island have vast discretion in sealing records. Rule 26
allows sealing "to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." 67
Trade secrets 68 and health records 69 are also protected by statute.
The specific inclusion of the word "embarrassment" allows a
justification for sealing records that is not considered sufficient for
60. Id.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 24, 44.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id. at 25.
66. See Reagan, supra note 36, at 447. The advantages that Reagan
attributes to "the times" would more aptly be attributed to the level of
government as well. The PACER system is more uniform and inclusive than
any single state system, and none of the states are easily compatible.
67. R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
68. R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-41-5 (2004).
69. Id. § 5-37.3-6.
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keeping record from public view in the executive branch context. 70
"Embarrassment" can hide a multitude of sins. In Rhode Island,
there is no requirement to have a hearing before sealing records or
to weigh the public interest in openness. Given these minimal
requirements, it is not surprising that the researchers found it
difficult to ascertain the reasons why secrecy was requested or
granted. Only 32 of the 87 cases had a motion to seal.71 In four of
those cases was there was a motion filed in opposition. 72 Only 43
of the 87 cases had an order to seal, and few of those orders
contained a specific statement of reasons. 73
The largest category of cases with sealed documents was
criminal injury compensation cases, where it appears that records
were sealed to protect information about crime victims.74 Two
well-accepted reasons for sealing documents, (1) medical records
and (2) trade secrets, dominated the other cases. 75 There were
also a few cases involving stalkers where the rationale for
confidentiality was apparent and well founded. 76 A handful of
cases, however, appeared to raise issues about the
appropriateness of confidentiality. The settlement and related
documents were explicitly sealed in one medical malpractice
case.77 The docket sheet in another medical malpractice case
indicated that documents reflected "process of credentialing staff,
Miriam Hospital" were sealed. 78  There were also sealed
documents involving "settlement with the YMCA" in a wrongful
death case. 79
Seven cases were sealed in their entirety.80 It is not clear
why these cases were sealed; if there was a justification in the file,
then that was also sealed. 81 Several of these cases appear to
implicate the public interest, and in two of the cases the
70. See R.I. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
71. Ross E. CHEIT ET AL., supra note 57, at 27.
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 27.
75. Id.
76. See id. app. C.
77. Id. at 40.
78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id. at 40-42.
81. See id.
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confidentiality order appears to violate the statutory requirement
that settlements against public entities are public record. 82 Two
were personal injury cases and two were assault and battery
cases. 83 While it is understandable why the plaintiffs name
might be shielded in a case against a school committee, it is
unclear why the entire file would be sealed. Also, a legal
malpractice case was sealed in its entirety without any
explanation. 84
The Brown University study did not uncover a worrisome
amount of sealing. Rather, the study demonstrated how difficult
it is to ascertain the extent of secrecy and the related rationales.
The study also confirmed that cases with potential impact on the
public interest had been sealed without sufficient normative
justification, although the broad discretion provided under
existing rules certainly allowed for this degree of secrecy.
In addition to examining the extent of sealing practices in
Superior Court, the study also tested whether settlements against
public entities were accessible public records, as required by
law.8 5 The study was based on two separate rounds of requests to
public entities-including cities, towns, school districts, and fire
districts-for settlement amounts and settlement documents in
specific cases. 86 Requests were made by mail, and a follow-up
request was made before concluding that an entity had not
complied.8 7 With a seventy-one percent compliance rate, one
could conclude that almost one-third of the public entities failed to
comply with the statutory mandate. 88
The lack of compliance was not openly defiant.8 9 That is,
public entities did not formally refuse to provide these
82. See id.
83. Id. at 30.
84. Id. at 43.
85. Id. at 33. In 1991, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted a
requirement that "records reflecting the financial settlement" by legal bodies
be deemed public records. The law was later amended and broadened to
include "settlement agreements of any legal claim" against a public body. Id.
(citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-14 (1998)).
86. Ross E. CHEIT ET AL., supra note 57, at 34-35.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 35.
89. See id. at 36-38.
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documents.90 Instead, they ignored multiple requests or they
referred requests to parties who were also unresponsive. 91 Those
external parties were likely to be private insurance companies
who insured the public entity and represented it in litigation.
92
Not surprisingly, these private entities were unresponsive to
"public records" requests for documents in their possession.93
This lack of compliance, whatever the reason, raises an important
implementation issue that is separate from the normative
question of whether existing practices involving the sealing of
cases are appropriate. These implementation issues are captured
in the four-fold table that contrasts legal status (not sealed or
sealed) with actual practice (accessible or not accessible). 94 The
Brown University study concludes that settlement documents
involving public entities, while deemed open record by statute, are
frequently inaccessible for a variety of reasons ranging from
organizational fragmentation to negligence through inattention.
95
These barriers might be overcome through litigation, but that
process can be a barrier of its own, given the time and expense of
litigation.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 36.
93. See id.
94. See infra p. 22.
95. Id. at 37-38.
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Actual accessibility
Formal legal status Accessible Not accessible
Not
Sealed
Sealed
249
Two additional notes should be made about this four-fold
table. First, the table captures errors of actual accessibility only.
It does not examine whether sealed records are appropriately
sealed in any normative sense, not does it examine whether open
records are appropriately open. The larger argument of this
article, of course, is that many properly sealed records should, by
policy change, be unsealed in the name of transparency and
accountability. Second, the error in the C Quadrant should not be
overlooked. Advocates of open government tend not to worry
about the government releasing too much information, but since
there are valid reasons for sealing records, it is important to
consider whether records that should be sealed are improperly
accessible. 96 The Brown University study did not discover many
instances of improperly accessible information, but there were a
few criminal victim compensation cases that contained
information about the victim that was supposed to be
confidential. 97
96. I have encountered this phenomenon in my own research on criminal
cases in trial courts. Confidential pre-sentence reports will sometimes be in
the public folder. Cases with protective orders are handed out with impunity
by clerks years later. Those are accidental. There is a separate question
whether cases with sufficient media interest could ever be kept truly sealed.
The answer is "no" in the area I have been studying--contested child sexual
abuse cases. There, the odd result is that seals are used to keep researchers
out, but the confidentiality has long since been compromised by less scholarly
media reporters. See Ross E. Cheit, The Elusive Record: On Researching
High-Profile 1980s Sexual Abuse Cases, 28 JUST. SYs. J. 79, 79-97 (2007).
97. Ross E. CHEIT ET AL., supra note 57, at 25.
A B
Open records Improperly
inaccessible
records
C D
Improperly Sealed records
accessible
records
250 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:232
3. Media investigative reports
The news media has been a leading force in examining
secrecy-related practices in courts in recent years. There have
been at least four significant investigations by newspapers in the
last four years. All of these investigations bear out that, whether
frequent or infrequent, these secrecy-related practices have
implications on the public interest.
a. Connecticut
In December 2002, the Connecticut Law Tribune published
the first story to reveal the existence of a practice that became
known as "super-sealing."98 These cases were so secret that they
did not appear on any public docket sheet.99 Court clerks were
instructed to deny their existence. 100  The Connecticut Law
Tribune, a weekly legal publication owned by the American
Lawyer, discovered this practice while researching a divorce
involving the president of the University of Connecticut.' 0 ' The
idea that a public figure would be able to hide a court file that
would otherwise be public raised obvious questions about
favoritism.
The Hartford Courant followed up on the issue a few months
later with a story that disclosed the existence of a "super-sealed"
paternity case against Clarence Clemons, a saxophonist in Bruce
Springsteen's E Street Band.'0 2 The Courant reported that a
court memorandum designated different levels of possible secrecy.
"Level 1" cases were completely confidential, including the case
name and docket number. 10 3 "Level 2" cases were those in which
the party names and docket number were public, but all other
information was sealed.10 4 "Level 3" cases contained some sealed
documents, but the docket sheet, the complaint, and some
98. Thomas B. Scheffey, State Divorce Courts Quick To Cloak Cases,
CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2002, available at Westlaw, 12/2/2002 Conn. L. Trib. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Eric Rich & Dave Altimari, Elite Enjoy 'Secret File' Lawsuits,
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 9, 2003, at Al.
103. See id.
104. Id.
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materials were usually in the public file. 10 5 Given the complete
secrecy surrounding Level 1 cases, it was almost impossible for
the Courant to report anything else about these cases. 10 6 They
reported, however, that "fellow judges, celebrities, and wealthy
CEOs" were selectively provided with the benefit of litigating out
of public view. 10 7 Most of the examples were civil cases outside
the realm of torts-divorces and paternity suits.108
Some of those cases might have significant public relevance,
particularly if they involve government officials. The Courant
quoted a lawyer who represented Brian Woolf, then the banking
commissioner in Connecticut, who defended the sealing of Woolf s
entire file because its contents could have been "a political
liability."10 9  "I asked to have it sealed because I was a public
official," Woolf told the Courant. 10 Whether confidentiality in
divorce cases is justified is a topic for another article. There were
at least a few tort cases uncovered in the Courant's investigation.
One of the "Level 2" cases, where the entire case file was sealed,
involved charges of child sexual abuse against the Rev. Felix
Maguire of the Hartford archdiocese.111
Public trust in the judicial system was clearly shaken by the
disclosure of the Kafkaesque practice of denying the existence of
existing cases. Within a few months of the articles that revealed
this practice, the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted a new rule
eliminating any provision for Level 1 cases after July 1, 2003.112
105. Editorial, 123 vs. 321: What Gives?, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 9, 2003.
106. See Secret File, supra note 102, at Al, A6.
107. Id. at Al.
108. See id. This article does not engage the relative merits of court
transparency in those contexts. While the interests of children in both
contexts certainly justifies some amount of confidentiality, it would be the
extreme case in which the least restrictive method of sealing would require
the equivalent of Level 2, or maybe even Level 1 sealing. There was
apparently one such case in Connecticut since 1990. After the court reviewed
all 104 cases in which Level 1 secrecy had been provided, there was one child
custody case that the court deemed it necessary to use pseudonyms for the
party names and seal the entire file. This is not to challenge that
determination in any way. Rather, what it notable is how few of the 104 were
ultimately seen as requiring this kind of secrecy.
109. Id. at A6.
110. Id.
111. Id. As reported in the article, 'Maguire lost the case, an outcome
that was revealed later only because the priest appealed the verdict." Id.
112. 2008 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 146-47, available at
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The new rule did not apply to existing cases, however.11 3
The Courant's constitutional challenge continued to focus on
the files that remained sealed."i 4 Judge Gerald Goettel of the
Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut rejected the
Courant's claim.'1 5 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Courant
prevailed."i 6 The court ruled that "the press and public possess a
qualified First Amendment right to access to docket sheets." 117
However, "[i]n the face of the threadbare record," the court
indicated that it was unable to ascertain whether there were even
explicit orders to seal the docket sheets in these cases. 1 8 The case
was remanded and reassigned to Judge Robert Chatigny, "who
held several hearings but had yet to rule" when the parties
eventually agreed to transfer the dispute to state court.119 The
judicial branch acknowledged the existence of at least 185 Level 1
files, but many were then converted to Level 2 status or unsealed
altogether. 120
Superior Court Judge Robert Beach Jr. ruled that docket
sheets in 27 of 40 cases still in contention should be released
without redactions.' 2 ' There were twelve cases in which the
parties' names were not released in order to protect their
safety.' 22 The docket sheet remained sealed in only one case,
involving child custody.123 A few months later, Chief Justice
Chase T. Rogers of the Connecticut Supreme Court announced
that the Judicial Branch would review approximately 500 Level 2
cases to determine "whether the cases were properly designated as
sealed" and "whether the motions and orders to seal may be made
http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PBl.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (D.
Conn. 2003).
115. Id. at 277-78.
116. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 86.
118. Id. at 98.
119. Lynne Tuohy, 'Super-Sealed' Case Files Transferred, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 7, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 9733424.
120. Dave Altimari, Judge Decries Court Secrecy: Orders Disclosure of
Super-Sealed Cases, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 22, 2007, A9.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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publicly available."'124 "Providing a mechanism for resolving
lingering public doubts about the sealing orders in these cases is
one of my top priorities," he explained. 125 The decision to
undertake this review "without intervention by the newspaper"
was seen as a positive development by an attorney for the media
outlets who sued to force a review of the Level 1 cases.
126
b. King County, Washington
The most extensive media study of court secrecy in recent
years was conducted by The Seattle Times, which published a
multitude of articles in 2006 from a two-year investigation of
sealing practices in King County Superior Court. 127 The Times
focused on civil cases-excluding divorce, adoption and probate
cases-in King County Superior Court since 1990.128 Extensive
electronic searching identified 10,337 cases with indications of
sealing practices. 129 This list was narrowed to approximately
3,000 cases. 130 That proved to be more cases than two reporters
could pursue in full. 131 After researching more than 1,000
partially sealed cases, they decided to focus the investigation on
cases that were sealed in their entirety.
132
The Times reported that local court veterans estimated that
they would find no more than a handful of such cases. 133 The
124. Chief Justice Announces Plan To Review Level 2 Cases, STATE OF
CONN. JUD. BRANCH (May 4, 2007), http://www.jud.state.ct.us/externall
news/press230.htm.
125. Id.
126. Dave Altimari, Sealed Cases To Be Reviewed: Some 'Level 2s' Involve
Prominent Corporate Leaders, Judges, HARTFORD COURANT, May 5, 2007, at
B1.
127. See Your Courts, Their Secrets, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 26, 2007,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/yourcourtstheirsecrets/. The SEATTLE
TIMES series, Your Courts Their Secrets, was a finalist for the 2006 Pulitzer
Prize in Investigative Journalism. Rani Gupta, Secret in Seattle, 31 THE
NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 4, available at http:lwww.rcfp.org/news/mag/31-
2/cov-secretin.html.
128. Gupta, supra note 127.
129. Michael R. Fancher, Our Battle Against Secrecy in the County's Legal
System, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A2.
130. Gupta, supra note 127.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id.
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newspaper identified 420.134 Many of those cases were in
categories that suggested possible impact on the public interest.
The largest category of cases (n=97) was tort cases and that count
did not include separate categories for medical malpractice (n=24)
and other malpractice (n=13).135 The reporters sought to examine
the motion to seal and the order to seal in all of these cases to
ascertain the extent to which they complied with the Washington
Supreme Court's requirement that judges find compelling
circumstances and "articulate its findings and conclusions" about
the competing interests. 136 Ultimately, the reporters were able to
examine the order to seal in 383 cases. 137 They concluded that 97
percent of the orders failed to comply with legal requirements. 138
Remarkably, the judges in King County voted 21-9 against a
proposal by a three-judge panel to correct the situation. 139 The
Times had to litigate on a case-by-case basis. 140 They pursued
legal remedies in at least three dozen cases that had strong
implications for the public interest.1 41 They succeeded in almost
all of those cases and wrote detailed stories about them.142 In one
of the first cases they reported, the secrecy protected a Superior
Court judge's mistakes as a lawyer. 143 The judge had been sued
for legal malpractice for actions shortly before he became a
judge.1 44 The allegations were that he missed three important pre-
trial deadlines, all to the detriment of his client. 145 Files from the
134. Id.
135. Kinds of Cases That Were Sealed, SEATTLE TIMES, graphic, available
at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/local/links/sealed05m.pdf.
136. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 721 (1982). The decision
even states: "If the order involves sealing of records, it shall apply for a
specific time period with a burden on the proponent to come before the court
at a time specified to justify continued sealing." Id. In its recent series, the
Seattle Times did not report on a single case in which this mandate was
followed.
137. Gupta, supra note 127, at 5.
138. Editorial, A Compelling Case To Open Records, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar.
7, 2006), at B6.
139. Gupta, supra note 127, at 3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Times Succeeds in Getting 35 Cases Opened So Far, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2006, at A22.
143. Ken Armstrong, Justin Mayo and Steve Miletich, Unsealed: A Judge's
Secret, a Therapist's Odd Methods, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A15.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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case were sealed in response to a claim by the judge's lawyer that
some allegations in the lawsuit "would cast him in a false light."
146 Neither that claim nor the one-sentence order to seal the case
satisfied existing legal requirements.1 47 Indeed, it appears that
the judge committed malpractice as a lawyer and used his position
as a judge to cover it up. 148 The secrecy in this case did not
implicate public health or safety, but it raised obvious questions
about favoritism in the sealing of cases. 149 The judge was
reelected twice while this settlement remained secret.
1 50
Another case sealed in its entirety was a lawsuit stemming
from the rape of a 13-year-old girl who blamed the Department of
Social and Health Services (DSHS) and YouthCare, a nonprofit
that operated group homes in Seattle, for failing to conduct
required criminal background checks and properly supervise the
"caregiver" who assaulted her. 151 The underlying story is filled
with missed warning signals and serious mismanagement at the
nonprofit which, according a DSHS employee internal email, "has
a very high powered board in Seattle."152 The judge who sealed
the file told the Seattle Times that he did so to protect the privacy
interests of the minor. 153 But the Times reported that virtually all
court documents used her initials, so those interests would be
protected even if the files were made public. 154 Remarkably, the
plaintiffs motion to seal stated explicitly that the file
"demonstrates unfavorable facts about both defendants."'155 That
has never been considered a legal reason for sealing a case, but it
nevertheless explains the apparent motivation of the parties in
this case. 156
Another worrisome case, with an extraordinary level of
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Ken Armstrong, Jonathan Martin, and Steve Miletich, Failures by
State, Caregiver Kept Secret in Child-Rape Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 27,
2006, at Al, A22-A23.
152. Id. at A23.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. See id.
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secrecy, involved a negligence claim against four school principals
for failing to heed repeated warnings about a teacher who fondled
young girls. 157 The teacher eventually served eight months in jail
for misdemeanor assault.158 The Times uncovered a decade of
warnings about Carl Leede to school officials by teachers and
teacher aides who witnessed improper touching. 159 The case was
not only sealed in its entirety, the settlement agreement ordered
the families and their attorneys "to gather whatever documents
they had about their allegations, and turn them over to be
destroyed.' 160 It forbade the parties, under penalty of $10,000,
from disclosing the settlement amount. 161 The Times discovered
that the settlement amount was $700,000 when they succeeded in
having the case unsealed.1 62 They also reported on the later
career success of the school principals who failed to heed clear
warnings about a molesting teacher.163
The Times also reported a $5.5 million settlement in a
medical malpractice case that was unknown to state Department
of Health regulators when the doctor faced disciplinary charges.
The malpractice case had been improperly sealed. 164 By providing
extensive details about specific cases that had been sealed, the
series, which became a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in
Investigative Journalism, demonstrated the nature of the public
interest in cases that had been sealed. The public interest in these
cases was sometimes health and safety related, other times it
involved issues of favoritism.
c. Broward County, Florida
The Miami Herald reported in April 2006 that 107 cases had
been "hidden from the public on a secret docket in Broward
Circuit Court" since 2001.165 The largest category, fifty-one cases,
157. Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, District Ignored Warnings, Then
Silenced Girls Fondled by Teacher, SEArrLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at Al.
158. See id. at A19.
159. Id. at Al, A18-A19.
160. Id. at A19.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, What the State Didn't Know About
Doctor, Malpractice Suit, SEArrLE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at Al.
165. Patrick Danner & Dan Christensen, Broward Court Cases Hidden
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was divorce. 166 The remainder included paternity, negligence and
contract disputes. 167 The two tort cases that The Herald described
had obvious public safety implications. In one case, "parents of 17
autistic children sued Nova Southeastern University for
negligence, claiming that the school had filed to conduct proper
background checks on a volunteer who molested their children."
168
The other case was a wrongful-death suit stemming from a US
Airways Express plane crash "which regulators blamed in part on
shoddy maintenance."1 69 The Herald reported that court clerks in
Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties confirmed the same practice.
170
They also reported that Former Florida Supreme Court Chief
Justice Gerald Kogan and other "veteran members of South
Florida's legal community" were apparently unaware of the
practice. 171
The Broward County Court Clerk denied the Miami Herald's
request for a list of civil cases that were not available for public
inspection; the newspaper then reported its intention to file suit to
obtain docket records. 172 The newspaper prevailed five weeks
later and reported notable details from the minimal information
that was released to them. But the same information was not
restored to the public docket. Two hospitals, for examples, were
defendants "in cases whose allegations and outcomes are
unknown."'173 A prominent Broward County lawyer "defended
against unspecified allegations made by a woman identified as
Jane Doe."'174 The newspaper then requested information on
super-sealed cases between 1989, when the clerk began
electronically docketing cases, to 2001.175 Three-hundred and
fourteen cases were identified, including "a 1999 negligence action
from the Public, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2006, at 1A.
166. Id. at 23A.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Patrick Danner & Dan Christensen, High-Profile Names Have Cases
Hidden on Secret List, MLAMIi HERALD, June 14, 2006, at 2B.
175. Patrick Danner & Dan Christensen, Broward Court: More Than 300
Cases of Local Leaders Were Removed from the Public View, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 18, 2006, at 1A, 2B.
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brought against Florida's Department of Children and Families"
and "other lawsuits involving about three dozen lawyers and at
least a half-a-dozen law enforcement officers."'176
d. Clark County, Nevada
The Las Vegas Review-Journal published a series of stories in
February 2007 about sealed civil cases in Clark County Nevada.
The reporting was based on a request to the court clerk for
information on sealed cases. A computer analysis, conducted by
the clerk's office, identified 115 cases sealed in their entirety since
2000.177
Consistent with both the FJC and the Brown University
studies, the percentage of sealed cases was a fraction of one-
percent of all cases filed.178
The reporter was able to cobble information together on a few
cases, but the newspaper did not engage in the kind of sustained
legal challenges that ultimately opened records for the Seattle
Times. This left the reporter with colorful metaphors and
insinuations of special treatment. One story began, "[a]s if
written with invisible ink. . . lawsuits. . . virtually have
disappeared after judges decided they should be hidden from the
public."'179 The story further declared that "[t]he list of litigants in
sealed lawsuits filed in Clark County District Court reads like a
Who's Who of Las Vegas."'180 But without detailed investigation of
specific cases, it is impossible to know how much affect these 115
cases had on the public interest. Still, a sizable number of elites in
Clark County had their cases sealed entirely since 2000. The
number is significant enough to raise questions about favoritism
in sealing records, even if the cases did not raise obvious issues
beyond the parties.
4. The Realm of the Unknown
There are strong impressionistic views about practices and
176. Id.
177. Frank Geary, The Case of the Missing Suits, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb.
11, 2007, at 1J, available at www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj-home/2007/Feb-l-
Sun-2007/news/12010385.html.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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trends in court-related secrecy. A recent article in The National
Law Journal reports, for example, that "critics claim that judges
are sealing records at an unprecedented rate."181  The
announcement for the recent RAND/UCLA conference on
Transparency in the Civil Justice System stated that "unlike
many other public institutions, the civil justice system has been
moving away from transparency and toward greater secrecy of
operations."1 8 2 A search of the relevant literature on transparency
and secrecy does not reveal any strong empirical evidence to
support either of these claims. They might nevertheless be true, of
course, but much remains unknown about the actual incidence of
various secrecy-related practices.
The systematic studies that have been conducted bear out the
limits of existing knowledge. The FJC study, which involved five
researchers and a massive amount of docket sheet analysis,
examined only sealed settlement agreements filed with the
court.18 3 This represented a small portion of all cases that were
settled. 184 Settlement agreements are not routinely filed with
courts.1 8 5 Some, perhaps many, of the cases without filed
settlements resulted in outcomes that remain confidential,
sometimes through nondisclosure agreements.18 6
The Brown University study encountered a different problem:
the vast majority of cases with sealed documents were not
indicated as such in the electronic docket.18 7 Similarly, the
extended litigation by the Hartford Courant resulted in a
significant victory against existing Level 1 cases. Their victory did
not include the approximately 800 Level 2 cases, which the court
system later agreed to reexamine (at a pace that will take
years).188 That leaves the largest category of cases, Level 3, where
181. Tresa Baldas, Sealed Records Meet Resistance, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 5,
2007, at 1.
182. Rand Corporation, RAND and UCLA Conference: Transparency in
the Civil Justice System, http://www.rand.org/events/2007/11/0 2 / (last visited
April 15, 2008).
183. See FJC Report, supra note 42, at i, 1, 3.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., id.
187. Brown University Study, supra note 57, at 22-23.
188. See Altimari, supra note 126, at B1.
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individual documents and portions of files are sealed. 189 There is
no systematic data about those cases or those practices. In short,
we know the least about the most frequent practices: limited
sealing in individual cases.
Not much is known about the use of pseudonyms, either. One
commenter asserts there has been an "onslaught" of anonymous
litigation since Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.190 That claim is
based on the case captions of published opinions in federal court
and state appellate courts. 191 Another commenter has noted that
this trend actually predated the Supreme Court's decision in Roe;
there were twenty-three federal decisions featuring anonymous
plaintiffs between 1969 and January 23, 1973.192 Most of those
cases involved abortion laws or welfare regulations governing
single mothers. 193 There were apparently 108 published decisions
involving anonymous plaintiffs in state and federal court in
1994.194 Like Roe v. Wade, some of those cases were constitutional
challenges, but Milini says that the "vast majority" were common
law tort actions between private parties.1 95
C. POLICY HISTORY
Concern about secrecy in the tort system has been expressed
in public debate since the late 1980s. The Washington Post
published a four-part series about secrecy in the civil justice
system in 1988.196 They reviewed "more than 75 sealed cases and
189. 123 v. 321, supra note 105.
190. Colleen E. Michuda, Comment, Defendant Doe's Quest for Anonymity:
Is the Hurdle Insurmountable?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 142 (1997).
191. Id. at 1660-62.
192. Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity
when a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41
WAYNE L. REV 1659, 1660-61 (1995).
193. Id. at 1661.
194. Id. at 1662. ("In 1994 alone, cases brought by anonymous plaintiffs
resulted in eighteen federal court of appeals decisions, thirty-three district
court decisions and fifty-seven state appellate court decisions.")
195. Id. at 1663.
196. See Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Court Secrecy Masks Safety
Issues; Key GM Fuel Tank Memos Kept Hidden in Auto Crash Suits, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1988, at Al; Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Hundreds of
Cases Shrouded in Secrecy; Area Suits Often Sealed with Few Queries, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al [hereinafter Shrouded in Secrecy]; Benjamin
Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Drug Firm's Strategy: Avoid Trial, Ask Secrecy:
Records Reveal Story of Zomax Recall, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1988, at Al;
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100 confidential settlements" 197 before concluding that "the
system of private justice . . . can prevent safety issues from
becoming public."'198 Two years later, Texas and Florida enacted
Sunshine in Litigation acts in an effort to prohibit confidentiality
from concealing public hazards. 199 Wisconsin Senator Herb Kohl
first introduced the Sunshine in Litigation Act in 1993. 200
Interest in the issue since then has been episodic, generally
prompted by a "horror story" about a particular case that receives
significant media coverage. The media reported two major "horror
stories" about tort secrecy between 2000 and 2002. One involved
product liability cases against Bridgestone/Firestone tires that
were eventually recalled, years after the company first settled
suits with sealed agreements. 20 1 The other involved the cover-up
of pedophile priests by the Catholic Church in Boston, where
lawsuits were settled for years on a confidential basis. 20 2 Major
newspapers also led several investigations concerning secrecy in
civil courts in the last five years.203
Benjamin Weiser & Elsa Walsh, Settlements Kept Former Drug Salesman's
Story Under Wraps, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1988, at A13; Benjamin Weiser &
Elsa Walsh, Secret Filing, Settlement Hide Surgeon's Record: Questions
Raised Over Patients'Deaths, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1988, at Al.
197. Shrouded in Secrecy, supra note 196, at Al.
198. Walsh & Weiser, Court Secrecy Masks Safety Issues, supra note 196,
at Al.
199. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2007); TEx. R. Civ. P. 76(a).
200. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1993, S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993).
201. See, e.g., Daniel G. Givelbar & Anthony Robbins, Public Health
Versus Court-Sponsored Secrecy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 131, 135 (2006)
(Bridgestone/Firestone tires mounted on Ford Explorers had resulted in at
lease 250 injuries and eighty deaths in the United States when, in 2000, a
pattern of secrecy and confidentially settled lawsuits became public.).
A wave of bad publicity followed the recall of Bridgestone/Firestone tires in
the summer of 2000. See Keith Naughton, Spinning Out of Control,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2000, at 58; Jim Morris & Marianne Lavelle, Secret
Data Reveal Why Tires Went Bad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 25, 2000,
at 42; Keith Naughton & Mark Hosenball, Peeling Apart, NEWSWEEK, June 4,
2001, at 38; 60 Minutes: Bridgestone Firestone (CBS television broadcast Oct.
1, 2000).
202. The "surge of media attention" focused on the Father John Geoghan
case in Boston generated "thousands of newspaper articles in 2002, and
placing the issue on the covers of Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World
Report." Lytton, supra note 11, at 852-53. See also, THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF
OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (Little,
Brown and Company 2002).
203. See supra Part B.3.
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Those events helped place the issue of court secrecy on the
agenda of legal policymakers. In 2002, the Federal Judicial Center
was asked by the Judicial Conference to provide "empirical
support" for an inquiry into sealed settlements agreements. 204
Three years later, the Sedona Conference, a legal think tank,
oversaw a Working Group on protective Orders, Confidentiality
and Public Access. The Working Group drafted a document
reflecting Best Practices and Guidelines on these issues in
2005.205 In March 2007, the Judicial Conference adopted two
recommendations aimed at improving access and transparency in
court proceedings. 206
1. Reform Proposals
How interest and concern about transparency translates into
actual rules and practices varies by state and by federal district. It
probably also varies by county and by judge. The FJC set out to
find "every state and federal statute and rule pertaining to sealing
of court records in civil cases. '207 The FJC found statutes or rules
in twenty-nine states that limited the sealing of court records in
civil cases:
Each of the states' rules limiting the sealing of court
records included one or more of five themes: (1) a good-
cause requirement (eleven states); (2) a least-restrictive-
alternative-means requirement (seven states), (3) a time
limitation on how long documents may remain sealed
(three states), (4) special concern about not sealing
settlement agreements with public parties (ten states);
and (5) special concern about cases involving public
204. Reagan, supra note 36, at 442.
205. THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE
ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES (2007),
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/wg2mayO5draft2.
206. The "access" recommendation concerned a pilot project to make
digital audio recordings of court proceedings available online through
PACER. The "transparency" recommendation "strongly urged" all federal
district courts to indicate on the electronic docket of a case is under seal. This
is instead of the disfavored practice of pretending that the case does not exist.
Greater Access to, Transparency in Court Proceedings Aim of Conference, 39
THE THIRD BRANCH, (March 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/ttb/2007-03/greater/index.html.
207. Reagan, supra note 36, at 444.
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hazards (one state).20 8
There have also been a few high profile reforms. Most notably,
the federal district court in South Carolina enacted a rule in 2002
that was widely described as "banning secret settlements,"
although the rule was actually quite limited in scope. 209 Texas
and Florida have had statewide rules concerning transparency in
the civil justice system since the 1990s. In Texas, a legislative
directive caused the Supreme Court of Texas to adopt what
became Rule 76a.2 10 The Rule creates a presumption that all court
records are public and it allows judges to seal records on the
specific showing that "a specific, serious and substantial interest
clearly outweighs the presumption of openness and "any probable
adverse effects" on public health of safety.211 The "Sunshine in
Litigation Act" in Florida prohibits courts from entering any
judgment or order "which has the purpose or effect of concealing
any information" concerning public hazards. 212 There has also
been a prompt response to embarrassing media coverage of
"super-sealed" cases in Connecticut and Florida. 2 13 There have
also been specific reforms in two sub-categories of tort cases:
medical malpractice and cases involving public defendants.
a. Medical malpractice
Some states have enacted laws aimed at disseminating
208. Id.
209. The rule applies only to settlement agreements that require court
approval, which is undoubtedly a tiny percentage of all settlement
agreements.
210. Section 22.010 of the Government Code states: "The supreme court
shall adopt rules establishing guidelines for the courts of this state to use in
determining whether in the interest of justice the records in a civil case,
including settlements, should be sealed." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.010
(Vernon 2004).
211. TEX. R. OF CIV. P. 76(1)(a).
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West 2007).
213. The Connecticut Supreme Court announced new rules eliminating
"super-sealed" cases effective July 1, 2003. See Chief Justice Announces Plan
to Review Level 2 Cases, (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.jud.
ct.gov/externallnews/press230.htm.
In Florida, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court formed a study group to
examine the issue in September, 2006. The court adopted new rules seven
months later. In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.420-Sealing of Court Records and Dockets, 954 So. 2d 16, 17-18 (Fla.
2007).
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information about the outcome of medical malpractice cases. In
Florida, for example, there is a requirement that insurers report
various information on claims, including final judgment,
settlement "in any amount," and even "final disposition of a
medical malpractice claim resulting in no indemnity payment. '214
Florida law directs the Department of Health prepare an annual
report on closed claims, "which shall be available on the
Internet. ''215 In Rhode Island, a 1997 statute directs the
Department of Health to compile and disseminate "physician
profiles" that include information on credentials, training,
disciplinary actions, and malpractice claims. 216
b. Public defendants
Specific laws have been aimed at increasing the transparency
of settlement agreements involving public entities. Case law
supports the idea that expectations of transparency are higher
when public entities are parties in the civil justice system. 217 In
the tort context, these cases involve claims about the soundness of
government operations. Some cases, such as litigation about the
safety of intersections or roads, literally involve public hazards.
Other cases, such as police brutality claims, raise important issues
about government accountability. All tort claims against
government have potential implications for public expenditures
214. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 627.912(1)(a) (West 2007).
215. Id. § 627.912(b)(b).
216. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37-9.2 (2004). Although law in action does not
necessarily reflect law on the books. See supra Part A. 1.
217. In State ex rel. Sun Newspapers v. Westlake Bd. of Ed., 601 N.E.2d
173 (Ohio App. 1991), the court held that a public entity could not enter into
confidentiality agreements involving public records. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals adopted the same view in a case involving a confidentiality
agreement in a civil rights case against the City of Memphis. "The idea of
entering into confidentiality agreements with respect to public records is
repugnant to and would thwart the purpose and policy of the Act."
Contemporary Media, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9807-CH00211,
1999 WL 292264, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App May 11, 1999). The Supreme Court of
Michigan recently decided that "a public body may not contract away its
obligations under the FOIA." Detroit Free Press Inc. v. City of Detroit, 744
N.W.2d 667 (Mich. 2008). The Mayor of Detroit had reached confidentiality
agreements with three former police officers in cases that included evidence
of an extra marital affair that he had denied in public. Monica Davey,
Document's Disclosure Adds to Scandal Over Detroit Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2008, at A13.
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through the cost of legal fees, insurance premiums, and actual
settlement payments. Those are sufficient reasons to mandate
transparency about the results of such litigation.
The FJC study identified ten states as having special concern
about not sealing settlement agreements with public parties. 218 In
Rhode Island, the confidential settlement of a police brutality
claim against the City of Central Falls resulted in litigation by the
Providence Journal under the Access to Public Records Act.
Applying a balancing test, Justice Murray ruled that "the public's
right to know outweighed a quadriplegic's desire to keep secret his
$1.5 million out-of-court settlement." 219 The plaintiff had sued for
$22 million.220 A few years later, the General Assembly enacted a
statute to designate "records reflecting the financial settlement by
public bodies" be deemed public records. 221 The statute was
amended seven years later to include the terms of the settlement
agreement.222 The U.S. Department of Justice adopted a simple
Statement of Policy in 1999 "against entering into final settlement
agreements or consent decrees that are subject to confidentiality
provisions. .. "223 That statement recognizes that there rare cases
that require unusual levels of confidentiality, but it also sets forth
a strong presumption of transparency.
2. Implementation Problems
The effects of the previously discussed reforms have been
more limited than often portrayed. First, several of these reforms
are quite limited in scope. That is, they cover only a small portion
of the practices that give rise to concern about transparency. The
rule against sealed settlements in South Carolina, for example,
applies only to settlements that require court approval. 224 Only
218. Reagan, supra note 36, at 444 (citing FJC Report, supra note 44, at
5).
219. Mark Sennott, Supreme Court Justice Rules Injury Settlement Must
Be Made Public,
PROVIDENCE J. (October 31, 1987), at A5.
220. Id.
221. R.I. Pub. L. 91-981.
222. Under the revised law, "[slettlement agreements of any legal claims
against a governmental entity shall be deemed public records." R.I. GEN.
LAws § 38-2-14 (2007).
223. 28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2007).
224. U.S. DIST. CT. D.S.C. Loc. Civ. R. 5.03(E).
266 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:232
guardianship cases and class action suits carry that
requirement; 225 virtually all other civil cases in South Carolina
federal court could still be settled with sealed settlement
agreements.
Similarly, reforms aimed at eliminating "super-sealed" cases
in Connecticut and Florida reach no more than the tip of the
confidentiality iceberg. There are far more Level 2 cases-where
the case is sealed in its entirety, but the case name is public-
than there ever were Level 1 cases. Moreover, the vast majority of
confidential practices are in Level 3 cases, where some portion of
the file is sealed. While much of this confidentiality is
undoubtedly appropriate, it is nearly impossible to assess in a
systematic way whether Level 3 practices are excessive. There are
well-recognized reasons, such as medical privacy, for sealing
particular documents. Judges have considerable discretion in
making these decisions. Several newspaper investigations of
sealing practices bear out the concern that judges might exercise
favoritism to protect certain elites, particularly in the legal
community. 226 Some of the "super-sealed" cases in Connecticut
involved judges 227 and the Whitehead case in Nevada, which
decreed widespread discretion for sealing cases, involved a
disciplinary proceeding against a judge. 228
The second implementation problem, then, is that policies
concerning court transparency are not self-implementing. There is
ample evidence, however, that rules alone are not enough to
ensure intended outcomes in this area. The unjustified secrecy
uncovered by the Seattle Times occurred while the prevailing
common law in Washington required a statement of reasons for
sealing documents and an explicit consideration of the public
interest. 229 The Times found those rules were ignored in virtually
all of the cases they uncovered. 230 Similarly, rules mandating that
225. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy and Judicial Discretion:
South Carolina's New Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L.
REV. 791, 795-96 (2004). (Only a small number of cases-those involving
minors or class actions, for instance-require that settlements be submitted
to or approved by the court.).
226. See supra Part B.3
227. See supra Part B.3.a.
228. See supra Part B.3
229. See supra Part B.3.b.
230. See id.
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settlements with public entities are public records require
monitoring and enforcement to assure meaningful compliance.
The Brown University study found that obtaining a settlement
agreement from a public entity was far more difficult than one
might think given the statutory mandate. Implementation issues,
largely stemming from the organizational disconnect between
public defendants and their private insurers, render these "public"
records improperly inaccessible. 231 The B Quadrant errors in
Table 1 are implementation problems that undercut legal
mandates. 232
Third, beyond the implementation problems that characterize
any system with the decentralized authority of trial judges, there
is evidence of real resistance to rules that mandate greater
transparency. Some judges consider the degree of prevailing
transparency to be entirely within their discretion. "There seems
to be some implication," noted Nevada Justice Supreme Court
Justice Shearer in a famous solo dissent, "that this court has an
unfettered right to seal any records it pleases."233
Beyond the prerogatives of judges, there are time-honored
norms of confidentiality in the legal profession. These norms have
roots in the bedrock attorney-client privilege. Judges are also used
to the confidentiality that cloaks their own deliberations. The
norms of the legal profession accept confidential settlements with
one major exception: if they limit the ability of the lawyer to
represent future clients.234 Concern for future claimants extends
only so far as it relates to future income for the lawyer entering
into a confidential agreement. There are no ethical canons that
require balancing the arguments for confidentiality against the
public interest in transparency. As a result, there is no pressure
for transparency and nothing to assure that mandates to that
effect are sustainable.235
231. See supra Part B.2.
232. See supra Part B
233. Whitehead v. NV Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 893 P.2d 866, 991
(Nev. 1995) (Shearing, J., dissenting).
234. Rule 5.6 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making... .an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to
practice is part of the settlement." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6
(2003).
235. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE
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Even in jurisdictions where the issue has received intense
publicity, resulting in more transparency, there is evidence of
slippage back towards secrecy. In Florida, the Miami Herald
reported that a review of sealing practices, just six months after
the Florida Supreme Court's high-profile reforms, found that
"judges often are failing to comply with some of the new law's key
requirements, such as specifying in writing the grounds for
sealing court records." 236  In Connecticut, the controversy over
"super-sealed" settlements overlapped with another controversy
about court transparency. 237 In a case where the court denied the
application of Connecticut's open records laws to the court's own
database, 238 the chief justice held up release of the decision in an
effort to protect his would-be successor. 239 One might wonder why
the court would not simply make these data available on their
own. Instead, the chief justice intentionally delayed the release of
this decision for political reasons.240 The decision to delay the
release of records certainly suggests that there is disinclination
towards transparency, albeit a divided position (since the decision
was 4-3). In Nevada, the State Supreme Court sanctioned sealing
in the Whitehead case, involving disciplinary proceedings against
a lower court judge.241 The decision was seen by many as
favoritism within the judiciary. The court's position has since been
criticized severely, but no reforms have been adopted yet and the
seemingly unlimited judicial discretion remains unchecked. 242 The
effects of this court-sanctioned secrecy were the subject of the Las
Vegas Review-Journal's recent investigation. 243
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 106-26 (2007).
236. Patrick Danner & Dan Christensen, New Rules on Court Records
Often Ignored, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 14, 2007, at Al.
237. See Altimari, supra note 126, at B1, B6.
238. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F. Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 2003).
239. See Tuohy, supra note 119.
240. Id.
241. Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 920 P.2d 491 (Nev.
1996); Frank Geary & A.D. Hopkins, Whitehead Ruling Set Precedent, LAS
VEGAS REV. J, Feb. 11, 2007, available at www.reviewjournal.com
Ilvrj-home/2007/Feb- 11-Sun-2007/news/1 1956173.html.
242. News Media Update: Senate Panel Rejects Bill on Sealing Court
Records, May 22, 2007, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
http://www.refp.org/news/2007/0522-sct-senate.html.
243. See Geary & Hopkins, supra note 241, at 3J.
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D. REFORM PROPOSALS
There has been an enormous amount of legal commentary
about confidential settlements and transparency in the civil
justice system. 244 The debate tends to focus on the abstract
question of whether more transparency would be better, and
hence whether the government should adopt rules to that effect.
None of the literature considers the underlying forces that favor
confidentiality in the court system nor does it consider the myriad
obstacles to overcoming confidentiality. As a result, there are
extended discussions about the desirability of rule changes but
little or no attention to the challenges in implementing such rules.
The fact is that rules alone will not change practices nearly as
much as some assume it will. Accordingly, this section contains
institutional reforms and possible rule changes.
1. Institutional pressure for openness
One major challenge in crafting meaningful measures to
increase transparency is that so many decisions about
confidentiality are necessarily made on a case-by-case basis.
Particular practices can be prohibited categorically, such as
"super-sealing" or sealed settlements. But, as the Hartford
Courant discovered, vast areas involving court secrecy require
painstaking case-by-case analysis. 245 After the Courant prevailed
in its legal challenge, they were able to declare victory in the
elimination of Level 1 cases; the newspaper also expressed
gratitude, and possibly relief, when the judiciary agreed to
examine the 800 Level 2 cases on its own. 246 The court is doing
this at a pace that will take years. It obviously would be better to
address the public interest in transparency at the time of sealing.
There are rules described below that would help encourage more
enlightened practices for sealing. There are also many reasons to
be skeptical about how these rules will be implemented over time.
An ambitious and novel proposal that anticipates that problem is
244. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time
To Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 463-64, n.2 (2006).
245. See Hartford Courant v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004);
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F. Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 2003).
246. Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 86; Altimari, supra note 126, at B1.
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aimed at changing the institutional features of courts.
a. Process-based rules
An obvious approach to improving case-by-case decision-
making is to require specific procedural protections. At least three
related procedural requirements are suggested in existing case
law. 247 First, there should be notice and hearing on any motion to
seal or to proceed with a pseudonym. The reasons for
confidentiality should be made public and subject to objections
from the pubic or the press. Second, the judge should give explicit
consideration to the public interest. Third, there should be a
statement of reasons given for whatever action is taken. Another
idea is that restrictions should be limited in time and the burden
of continued confidentiality should rest on the moving party. 248
These are all clearly good ideas. They are also all far less effective
that they might appear at first glance. All of these requirements
were in effect in King County, Washington when the Seattle
Times found routine violation of the standards. 249 Moreover, the
FJC study found no statistical difference in the incidence of sealed
settlement agreements between jurisdictions that required a
statement of reasons and those that did not.250 Rules that instruct
judges to limit their discretion are particularly ineffective when
the paperwork that would cause one to examine the exercise of
discretion is itself sealed. Several of the studies mentioned above
encountered the problem that motions to seal or orders to seal
were apparently sealed themselves.
b. Institutional design
There is little or no institutional interest in openness in the
civil justice system. Litigants in many cases prefer confidentiality.
Plaintiffs who might actually prefer a public settlement tend to be
faced with the choice of giving that up in exchange for higher
247. See supra Part C.
248. In surveying local rules for the Federal Judicial Center study, Reagan
found three federal jurisdictions with time limitations on how long documents
may be sealed; those rules allowed for the seal to be continued, but only upon
a showing by the moving party. Reagan, supra note 36, at 444, n.42.
249. See Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, What the State Didn't Know
About Doctor, Malpractice Suit, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at Al, A7.
250. FJC Report, supra note 42, at 3 n.7.
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compensation. Put differently, the defendant buys silence. That
may sound overstated, but it accurately captures the gist of a tax
decision holding that payments made in conjunction with
confidential settlements are partially taxable.
251
Judges are not actual guardians of the public interest in
openness. Indeed, their own interests tend to conflict with
openness. Confidentiality helps promote settlement; it also
advances the judge's interest is moving cases along. Moreover,
several of the newspaper investigations found that confidentiality
had been improperly exercised in cases where judges were a
party.252
There is a need for some kind of institutional change to
remedy this situation. Transparency policies are effective only if
they are sustainable. 253 One thing that has made the Freedom of
Information Act sustainable is that federal administrative
agencies have Freedom of Information officers. 254 The officer's
purpose is to respond to public records requests under the federal
statute.255 Having institutionalized an interest in public records,
there is a much greater chance of implementation and
sustainability even though FOI implementation undoubtedly
varies by agency. State agencies often have equivalents. 256 At the
local level, it is not uncommon for a police department to
designate a Public Records Officer. Institutionalizing the function
does not guarantee implementation, of course, but it does make
implementation and sustainability much more possible.
The civil justice system needs some kind of equivalent to a
Freedom of Information Office. A Freedom of Information Office is
251. See Robert A. Clifford, Confidentiality May Cost Plaintiffs Plenty in
Taxes, CHI. LAW. (June 2004), at 38 (discussing Amos v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 2003-329 (Dec. 1, 2003) (confidential settlement between former
basketball player Dennis Rodman and a photographer)).
252. See, e.g., Secret File, supra note 102, at B1.
253. FUNG, ETAL., supra note 235, at 109-10.
254. See Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (1995); FOIA
Administrative and Legal Contacts at Federal Agencies, Dept. of Justice,
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-updates/VoLXX-l/page3.htm (last visited
April 15, 2008).
255. Id.
256. WikiFOIA-Laws by State, http://wikifoia.pbwiki.com/laws (All of the
states, as well as the District of Columbia and some territories, have enacted
similar statutes to require disclosures by agencies of the state and local
governments, though some are significantly more broad than others.).
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not the same as a Public Information Office, which serves a public
relations function not a public records mission. Court clerks might
serve the public records mission, but they are too beholden to
judges. The newspaper investigations of sealing practices are
filled with instances of clerks implementing without question
dubious judicial decisions about sealing.2 57 There is a need for an
advocate for the public interest at key points in the civil justice
system-e.g., when party names are concealed, when documents
are sealed, when cases are settled, and when policies are made
about electronic access for the public. An advocate for public
access could monitor the provision of reasons given by judges and
provide a voice for the public's interest in transparency. The legal
advocate might be akin to a guardian. The interest being protected
would be the public's right to know. This may be a radical idea,
but it may also be the only way to address the problem effectively.
2. Improve the quality and accessibility of court data
There is also a significant need to improve the quality of data
in the civil justice system. In very few states is it possible to
obtain the kinds of data necessary to analyze the system as a
whole. 258 Without such data, it is difficult to evaluate a host of
genuine tort reforms-which is why this proposal is so
foundational.
On the specific issue of confidentiality, there are no solid
statistics about the prevalence of the practice at large. Docket
sheets do not routinely reflect this information, let alone in a
uniform fashion. Both the FJC study and the investigation by the
257. In Nevada, the newspaper documented a case in which several court
clerks clashed with a judge over what appeared to be an improper attempt to
destroy records. Carrie Geer Thevenot, Parraguirre: Case Demonstrates Needfor Independent Clerk, LAs VEGAS REV. J., Dec. 17, 2006, available at
www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj-home/2006/Dec- 17-Sun-
2006/news/1 1466380.html.
258. Few states have integrated court systems. The National Center for
State Courts' Compilation of Public Access Web Sites includes civil and
criminal-related sites for every state. Some are limited to appellate cases,
others cover only a portion of the state. Only Hawaii, Iowa and Oregon
provide access to civil cases state-wide through the web. New Mexico
essentially has statewide access-a password is required for access to on
county. The judicial information system contains information on the 12
largest counties in the state and all appeals statewide. http://www.ncsonline.
org/wc/courtopics/statelinks.asp?id=62&topic=PriPub.
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Seattle Times involved extensive electronic searching of electronic
docket sheets, and both studies encountered difficulties in the
process. 259 The Brown University study encountered significant
difficulties in obtaining information about sealed documents; the
names of cases with sealed documents were collated on index
cards kept by the court clerk, who never fulfilled a promise to
produce a list of those cases. 260 It would be possible to track
confidentiality practices and examine specific instances much
more easily if electronic court record contained these data in some
standard form.
Databases should also be accessible. Some jurisdictions are
starting to make civil court records available online, but these
examples are rare and the extent of available data is much less
than in the federal PACER system.261 There are very few states in
which databases of civil court records can easily be obtained.
262
The need for public policies in this direction was underscored
when the Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the judicial
databases in Connecticut were not subject to the state's open
records act.263
3. Mandate more transparency
Greater transparency could be mandated in the civil justice
system in several other ways. First, general provisions such as
Senator Kohl's Sunshine in Litigation Act can promote openness
across the board. 264 Second, targeted bans can prohibit specific
practices such as secret settlements involving government
defendants. Finally, even more narrowly targeted rules can be
aimed at practices such as the use of pseudonyms. These practices
provide a significant shield against public view and there has been
little consideration of when that kind of confidentiality is
warranted.
259. See supra Part B.3.b, B.2.
260. Brown University Study, supra note 57, at 24.
261. Public Access to Court Electronic Records, Overview, http:I/pacer
.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html.
262. See text, supra note 258.
263. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 290 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (D.
Conn. 2003).
264. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1993, S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993).
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a. Sunshine in Litigation acts
Senator Herb Kohl (D-Wisc.) first introduced a federal
Sunshine in Litigation Act in 1993.265 He has reintroduced it
many subsequent years.266 The bill would require federal judges
to consider public health and safety when approving settlements
and it would prohibit the use of "secret settlements" in cases in
involving public hazards.267 Rule 76a 268 in Texas and a Sunshine
in Litigation statute in Florida, 269 are often most often mentioned
as examples of existing policies to this effect. In Rhode Island,
Representative Fausto Anguila (D-Bristol) introduced a bill in
2003 that prohibited the concealment of public hazards through
judicial confidentiality. 270
While the idea of mandating attention to the public interest is
admirable, the practicality of changing the world by telling judges
to change their discretionary judgments seems doomed to
disappoint. Various Sunshine in Litigation acts incorporate
balancing tests, the outcomes of which are uncertain at best.2 7 1 A
simpler and more definitive idea for increasing transparency is to
ban confidential settlements. This concept can be implemented
modestly or it can be implemented expansively. A modest version
includes the simple Rhode Island statute, enacted in 1991,
mandating that "records reflecting the financial settlement" of
legal claims against public bodies "shall be deemed public
records."272 The statutory designation alone, however, does not
265. Id.
266. S. 374. 104th Cong. (1995); S. 225.105th Cong. (1997); S. 957. 106th
Cong. (1999); S. 3070. 107th Cong. (2001); S. 817. 108th Cong. (2003); S.
1348. 109th Cong. (2005); S. 2449. 110th Cong. (2007).
267. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2007, S. 2449. 110th Cong. (2007).
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76(A).
269. Fla. Sunshine in Litigation Act (Fla. Stat. § 69.081) (2004).
270. The Rhode Island Limits to Secrecy Orders and Agreements Act of
2003, H. 6613 (also introduced by Representatives Murphy, Malik, Gallison,
and Munschy).
271. Texas is heralded as a leader in judicial openness for Rule 76a. Yet, a
private contractor operating a juvenile detention facility can negotiate a
confidential settlement over events involving the exercise of state power.
Toon v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., 250 F.3d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2001). Also,
the Texas Supreme Court sustained an order limiting disclosure of trial court
documents in case against the Upjohn Company over the drug Halcion.
Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.
Sup. Ct. 1992).
272. R.I. GEN. LAws § 38-2-14 (2007).
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mean that these records will be readily available. 273 Expansive
versions of transparency include the Florida requirement that
information about the terms of virtually all medical malpractice
settlement information be available on the Internet without
charge.274
b. Rules limiting the use of pseudonyms
The use of pseudonyms instead of party names is another
practice that limits public access to court records. The information
that pseudonyms conceal-the identity of one or more parties-is
among the most basic information that is normally available on a
docket sheet. In its own investigation, the Seattle Times found
cases labeled "Confidential v. Confidential, in county
Confidential. '275 The same practice can be found in the California
Bar Journal. 276 Both of those examples involve private companies
that report jury verdicts and settlements. Those firms sometimes
use pseudonyms when the actual names are in public court
records. But court records also include cases in which one or both
parties have pseudonyms by court order. Minors receive this
protection as a matter of course. So do people in the witness
protection program. The common-law list, cited in Doe v.
University of Rhode Island, recognizes seven categories where a
court might allow a plaintiff to proceed with a pseudonym. 277 This
is an area of apparently wide discretion.
There are very few actual rules about the use of pseudonyms
in litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no
provision for pseudonyms. Rule 10(a) provides that "in the
complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all
parties."278 There is no outright prohibition on pseudonyms either.
The matter seems to be entirely in the discretion of judges. Most
people recognize the appropriateness of providing protection in
273. Brown University Study, supra note 57, at 33-37.
274. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(f) (2008).
275. See Armstrong & Mayo, supra note 164.
276. See Gallbladder Surgery, CAL. ST. B.J. 4 (May 2007).
277. Doe v. Univ. of R.I., No. 93-0560B, 1993 WL 667341 (D.R.I. Dec. 28,
1993) (citing Doe v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72
(D.R.I. 1992) ("Cases of this type commonly involve 'abortion, mental illness,
personal safety, homosexuality, transsexuality, and illegitimate or abandoned
children in welfare cases"'). Id.
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
276 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:232
cases involving at least some of the seven categories mentioned
above. A body of common law allows for balancing various
interests.
Recent cases have disallowed the use of pseudonyms by
plaintiffs in tort cases involving sexual assault. A student at
University of Rhode Island was not allowed to proceed
pseudonymously in a tort case, notwithstanding her showing that
disclosure would cause "personal embarrassment and perhaps
ridicule." 27 9 The parents of man who died from AIDS were not
allowed to proceed pseudonymously in a life-insurance dispute
with their son's former partner.280 It would be "inappropriate for
the Court to bar access to otherwise public records solely on the
basis of subjective feelings of confidentiality or embarrassment,"
the court reasoned. 281 A woman in New York was not allowed to
proceed pseudonymously against Tupac Shakur in a case
involving allegations of sexual assault.282 Most unusually, in a
recent federal case, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decided on his own motion that a woman who had been
allowed to proceed pseudonymously, in a civil case over rape
allegations against a Chicago police officer, should have to reveal
her identity. 28 3 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did
likewise in a products liability case involving breast implants--on
their own motion, they noted that "we see no reason to refer to the
plaintiffs by way of pseudonyms in this opinion. '284
On the defendant side: it is impossible to know how often this
occurs. There has been little commentary and there are few cases,
so perhaps it is a rare phenomenon. Steinman critiqued the
decision in Doe v. A Corporation, arguing that the court allowed
the defendant to avoid public identification for "entirely unclear"
reasons. 285 One commenter has called for symmetry in intentional
tort case: that is, defendants should have anonymity if plaintiffs
279. Doe v. Univ. of R.I., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19257 (1993).
280. Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.R.I. 1990).
281. Id.
282. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359 (1996).
283. Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2004).
284. Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).
285. Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should
Litigants Be Permitted To Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.
J. 1 (1985).
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do. 28 6 But a few appellate decisions suggest an indulgence for
defendants that seems out of proportion to the cases requiring
rape victims to proceed publicly.287 Indeed, any lack of symmetry
seems to be against victims of sexual assault, who have lost
numerous cases to proceed anonymously. 28 8 Meanwhile, a level
three sex offender was allowed to challenge a Massachusetts
statute anonymously 28 9 and a U.S. citizen who was arrested at
Los Angeles International Airport with hundreds of images of
naked young boys was allowed to proceed anonymously in his
challenge of a restitution order.290
The Sedona Guidelines state that "the use fictitious names is
disfavored and exceptional circumstances must be shown to do
so."291 The report cites Doe v. City of Chicago, which disallowed a
plaintiff to proceed anonymously in a rape claim against the
Chicago Police Department. 292 "One searches in vain to find
anything to support this reading in the text of Judge Posner's
balancing test," remarked Assistant U.S. Attorney Peter Winn in
a written commentary on the Sedona Guidelines. 293 Indeed, the
286. Milani, supra note 192, at 1698 ("It is precisely because of the
potential risk to the names and reputations of the defendants accused of
stigmatizing intentional torts that-where the plaintiff has sued under a
pseudonym-courts should also consider allowing defendants to proceed
anonymously.").
287. In United States v. John Doe, 488 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007), the
defendant was allowed to proceed anonymously in an action challenging a
restitution order followed his guilty plea to the production of child
pornography outside the United States. The court justified the anonymity "to
protect [the defendant] from injury or harassment." Id. at 1155-56 n.2.
288. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2004); Doe v.
Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359 (1996); Doe v. Univ. of R.I., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19257.
289. See Soe v. Chief of Police of Waltham, 818 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 2005).
290. U.S. v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2007). He was allowed to proceed
anonymously in challenging a restitution order. The court apparently decided
that this was an "exceptional case" where anonymity was necessary to
"protect a person from injury or harassment." Id.
291. THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE
ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES 3 (2007),
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/wg2may05draft2.
292. 360 F.3d at 667.
293. Peter A. Winn, Electronic Access to Court Records and Sensitive
Information, Presentation Material for September 8, 2005 Conference on the
Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders,
Confidentiality and Public Access in Civil Cases (on file with author).
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balancing test seems far more likely to allow a fictitious name
than a rule that requires "exceptional circumstances" for doing so.
No good data exist concerning the frequency of this practice.
Of course, that helps justify the earlier proposal for better and
more accessible data. Indeed, it is particularly hard to study
fictitious names because there are no uniform standards for
pseudonyms. Electronic searching of case names would likely miss
cases that use less traditional methods to accomplish the same
purpose. In Dollan v. Dollan, a Massachusetts case involving a
challenge to a restraining order, both names are pseudonyms. 294
Moreover, while pseudonyms can mask the identity of known
parties, they are also used to name unknown parties. That is how
"Dr. Roe" often appears in case captions of federal cases found on
Lexis.
E. CONFRONTING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIONS
The proposal to institutionalize advocacy for court openness is
novel enough that there are no published objections. This proposal
is likely to come through a legislative mandate, so there may be
objections by the judiciary about encroachment by the legislative
branch. But Rule 76a 295 in Texas was the product of a legislative
mandate to the court; the law directed the court to adopt rules.
Certainly, a legislature could mandate and fund a Public Advocate
position. Similarly, no obvious objection exists to improving
databases and their accessibility beyond the standard concerns
about cost. Judges also tend to invoke concerns about privacy
when faced with proposals about transparency. But the PACER
system296 demonstrates the kind of system that is possible
without compromising privacy concerns.
There are well-worn objections to the idea of greater
transparency in civil litigation. These objections are often
internally inconsistent. Some argue that greater transparency will
lead to more cases being filed; others argue that more cases will be
diverted from the tort system. Some argue that cases will take
longer to settle, others worry that they might settle too quickly.
294. Dollan v. Dollan, 771 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
295. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
296. Public Access to Court Electronic Records, Overview, http://pacer.psc.
uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
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While it is unlikely that all of these objections would come to pass
at the same time, it is worth considering each one individually.
1. More cases will be filed
The most common argument against policies that would make
settlement agreements public is such policies would increase the
number of lawsuits. Moreover, if transparency mandates include
materials obtained through discovery then, as Richard A. Epstein
has argued, "this will reduce the cost of filing lawsuits, and
increase the number of 'follow-on' suits."297  This argument is
generally made in terms that describe the "follow-on" claims as
nuisance suits.298 It would be unseemly to argue against an
increase in well-founded suits, but those are the kinds of cases
most likely to "follow-on." It defies logic to claim that disclosure of
"nuisance value" payments would attract the interests of
plaintiffs lawyers who work on a contingency fee basis. The idea
of "copy cat" litigation makes much more sense if the settlement
payment is large. But even then, knowing that a particular doctor
or tire manufacturer paid out a significant sum has relevance only
to that doctor's patients who have had medical problems and to
those who have had a problem with the same tires.
In Florida, no evidence has been produced that publicizing
outcomes has caused more people to file medical malpractice
claims. Similarly, there is no evidence that claims against public
bodies have increased in Rhode Island after the legislature
mandated that the terms of settlement agreement be made public.
In the circumstances where "follow-up" litigation is most likely, it
is probably also most warranted. This is a classic instance of
where opponents of genuine tort reform reveal the core of their
own position in dissent: they are against the tort system itself and
297. Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on
Secret Legal Settlements Does More Harm Than Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3,
2002 at D1.
298. Id. Epstein is not entirely clear on the point. He worries that follow-
up litigation will occur "even in cases where the defendant has fought the
case very hard." Presumably, fighting "very hard" implies that the defendant
had a strong position factually. If that position was so strong factually,
however, then the settlement or verdict would be extremely low. It might be
zero. Neither Epstein nor anyone else has offered a reason why claimants and
lawyers would rush to follow suit under those circumstances. Id.
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view additional cases only in terms of increased costs. 299 The idea
that more injuries might be deterred or compensated does not
seem to enter the equation.
2. Fewer cases will settle; the process will take longer
The other most frequent objection to increased transparency
is that it will result in fewer cases settling. Cases will last longer
and victims will go uncompensated longer, the argument goes. It
does stand to reason that if part of what defendants are currently
doing when they settle confidentially is buying confidentiality,
then the value of settling will decrease if it cannot be confidential.
So, too, if keeping the matter confidential is what is most
important and settlement cannot offer that outcome, then
defendants might be more likely to go to trial. But if the choice is
trial or public settlement, they are going to lose confidentiality
either way.
Trials have their own costs, of course, which will not decrease
simply because the system is more transparent. The incentives
against incurring the cost of trial will remain. But at the margin,
the loss of confidentiality should increase the number of cases that
go to trial. Since there has been hang-wringing recently over the
declining number of cases that go to trial,300 a modest change in
the other direction does not seem objectionable. This might mean
more trials in cases that would have been settled for nuisance
value. Assuming those cases could not stand on their merits, there
would be an increase in the number of defense verdicts. In the
long run, more defense verdicts should quell litigation in ways
that would be in the public interest.
299. Id. Epstein reveals that he does not think that the tire manufactures
should have liable at all, since their tires satisfied federal regulations.
(Epstein does not mention that the tires were later recalled, negating any
notion that the federal government found the product acceptable when they
eventually had the information that Firestone tried to conceal.) He is also
skeptical of whether lawsuits against the Catholic Church are a good idea,
since paying victims "deprives the Church of money it needs to right itself."
Id.
300. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Trial-less Lawyers: As More Cases Settle,
Firms Seeks Pro Bono Work To Hone Associates' Courtroom Skills, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 1. 2005, at B1.
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3. There will be a loss of privacy
A third objection to increased transparency speaks directly to
the loss of privacy that might result from greater transparency.
Legitimate privacy interests would still be recognized under
regimes of greater transparency, of course. Medical records, for
example, will always be considered private. But things that might
cause embarrassment will not necessarily be protected. The
rationale that avoiding embarrassment justified secrecy allowed
for the unchecked favoritism that was discovered in Connecticut
and the cover-up of sexual abuse by priests that was discovered in
Boston. The best response to the concern about privacy is that we
have erred too far in the name of confidentiality.
4. More cases will move to Alternative Dispute Resolution 30 1
A fourth objection to increasing transparency in the tort
system is that more cases will be diverted to Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR). This objection seems to contradict the other
three, which basically anticipate more cases, lasting longer and
resulting in more public outcomes than ever before. But maybe
increased transparency would bring more cases into the public
system and more cases into ADR. Either way, we should be
concerned about whether proposed reforms might divert cases
from the public system into private alternatives that are less
transparent. If so, then increasing transparency might ultimately
decrease transparency. Drahozal and Hines argue in detail that
restrictions on secret settlements "may in fact be
counterproductive." 30 2  Whether or not the result is
counterproductive, it does seem likely that more cases will settle
privately. Moss predicts that a ban on secret settlements would
lead to an increase in "pre-filing settlements" for a different
reason: because confidentiality bans "could not effectively reach
pre-litigation settlements." 30 3
301. I thank Professor Deborah Hensler for raising this important point in
discussion at the Genuine Tort Reform conference at Roger Williams
University Law School.
302. Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement
Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1459
(2006).
303. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of
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These are legitimate reasons for concern. If tort cases are of
public interest largely because of their health and safety
implications, then privatizing dispute resolution might have
adverse consequences. Perhaps the strongest example of this
problem involves government services that have been privatized.
Unless a public mandate about transparency follows the public
dollars, there could be a significant loss in transparency through
privatization. An unusual appellate case in Texas-where Rule
76a has been heralded as promoting a more open tort system-
bears out this concern. In Toon v. Wackenhut, a $1.5 million
settlement that was reached through private mediation became
public in a post-mediation dispute that began when the defendant
did not transfer the funds by the designated date. 30 4 The
underlying claim in the case involved allegations of sexual and
physical abuse at the Coke County Juvenile Justice Center in
Bronte, Texas. 30 5 Wackenhut is a private contractor that operates
prison facilities.30 6 The idea that Wackenhut could manage to
keep this kind of claim confidential is deeply disturbing given that
the case involved allegations of abuse of minors in state
custody.30 7 It is quite possible that Wackenhut's use of private
mediation was prompted by Rule 76a. 308 But that should not be
used to argue against greater transparency. Instead, it is an
argument for making sure that every state's public records act
extends to private organizations who conduct the public's
business. Litigation involving public contractors carrying out
public functions should be seen as no less of public concern than if
the government carried them out directly. 30 9
What about the uncertain number of private parties who will
move from the public courts to more private systems of dispute
resolution? How worried should we be? In one respect, there is no
reason for concern. Private dispute resolution carries none of the
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 872 (2007).
304. 250 F.3d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2001).
305. Id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a.
309. For example, the Access to Public Records Act in Rhode Island covers
public bodies and "any other public or private agency, person, partnership,
corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of and/or in place of any
public agency." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(1) (2007).
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public accountability arguments that come with public institutions
and public money. There is no constitutional presumption of
openness in private dispute systems. But private agreements can
have public health or safety implications. Doctors seem
particularly likely to be attracted to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms that protect confidentiality and hence reputation.
These problems are not insurmountable. Indeed, the medical
malpractice reporting statute in Florida applies to "any claim or
action for damages."310 In other words, the statute requires
reporting of settlements of "claims," which precede legal "actions."
Whether the Florida statute would be interpreted to apply to
private dispute resolution, a statute could be crafted to cover such
settlements. The statute that provides for federal agencies to
participate in ADR strikes a batter balance on these issues as
well. 3 11 Under the ADR Act, the final settlement agreement is
specifically excluded from the definition of protected
communications. Nor does ADR provide a cloak against acts such
as fraud or sexual abuse, where there are separate reporting laws.
There are also requirements in the ADR Act to collect information
for systematic analysis, although "no agency currently collects all
of the data needed for an impact evaluation of its individual
program."312
F. CONCLUSION
A genuine reform would be to have much more transparency
in the tort system. This could be accomplished in various ways.
Some implicate judicial operations beyond torts, other are specific
to the public harm aspects of tort law. Focusing too narrowly on
the public harm arguments minimizes the weight of other
arguments in favor of greater transparency. The avoidance of
favoritism, the maintenance of trust, and the effectuation of
integrity are all important in the civil justice system. In that way,
transparency would increase public confidence in the courts.
Those who are most alarmist about the tort system, and generally
310. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.912(l)(a) (West 2007).
311. 5 U.S.C. § 571(5) (2000).
312. Tina Nabatchi, The Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Government, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 646, 658
(July/August 2007).
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argue on anecdotes alone about the so-called litigation explosion,
are also adamantly against such transparency. Richard Epstein
asks, "why force people to substitute private arbitration for
litigation to escape the glare of the public eye?" 313 The question
could be reversed. Why allow people using public institutions to
escape the mechanisms of accountability that come with public
institutions?
In broader terms, more transparency would facilitate a better
understanding of a system that is often characterized by "horror
stories." We would do well to allow for a more open and informed
argument about the costs and benefits of the tort system.
313. See Epstein, supra note 297, at D1.
